



## INFORSE on UNFCCC COP26 – The Outcome

*As the UNFCCC COP26 ended overtime Saturday night 13/11, 2021, many decisions and new directions were agreed. It did not secure a stable climate, but it set directions for future climate actions, with improvements, but also with new problems. It set the course for higher climate ambitions in future, and it concluded the “Paris Rulebook”, the guidance needed to implement all parts of the Paris Agreement.*

### Glasgow Climate “**Emergency**” Pact – A Compromise and a Hope - Watered Down

The UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for “*time to go into **emergency mode**, ending fossil fuel subsidies, phasing out coal, putting a price on carbon, protecting vulnerable communities, and delivering the \$100 billion climate finance commitment.*” He concluded, “We did not achieve these goals at this conference. But we have some building blocks for progress.” “*an important step, but it's not enough*”. These words reflected many countries' final speeches before the decision. They all hoped more, and *wished better wordings, but they had to accept the compromise*. It is better than nothing, and they wished countries will do more than what was agreed . It was a real depressing series of statements.

On the last day of COP26, when the text was adopted, the draft text was altered in several places to reach a compromise. The “*Glasgow Climate **Emergency** Pact*”, which was called for by the most vulnerable countries, became called “*Glasgow Climate Pact!*” - where the word “**emergency**” was **deleted**, illustrating the missing sense of emergency. **There is hope**, as there is an agreement and progress was made by keeping the recognition of targeting the 1.5-degree Celsius limit. However, **it is a “watered down” hope!** The countries are **urged**, but **only “urged”**, to “**phase down**”, but not “**phase out**” coal, they do not agree to act instead **agree “to consider”** improvement.

There is a **wide gap from the submitted plans (NDCs)** that will lead to 2.7°C, but there are actions promised outside the official process, with a possibility that the gap will be less. **A rich country can pay other countries to reduce emissions and still claim that it is leading in emission reductions. However the proposed double counting of emissions was excluded. The rich countries are only “urged” to fully deliver the \$ 100 Billion per year for climate funding, and they are not asked to compensate for earlier non-payment.**

The rich countries continued to ignore their historical responsibility, and **blocked finance for Loss and Damage**. This is called a “**clear betrayal of the planet and people**” as per the Environmental NGO Constituency. The countries are though “**urged**” to **finance loss and damage, and the countries agreed to strengthen the Santiago network, to make information exchange on how to deal with it.**

The compromised result also reflects that our presence and voices as observer, **Civil Society Organisations, were severely restricted through several barriers. For COP27, we demand that the UNFCCC Secretariat facilitates and not restricts the presence of the civil society, and the renewable energy associations, as well as NOT permit the greenwashing by industries including the dangerous nuclear industry. Inclusiveness of civil society and promotion of real sustainable climate solutions, can bring more understanding to the national negotiators on what is at stake: human life on the Earth.**

**Read more on these after our Analysis of the Glasgow Climate Pact, Finalising the Paris Rulebook, Agreements on Future UNFCCC Activities, and Actions Outside the Official Process.**

## Analysis of the Glasgow Climate Pact

COP26 agreed an overall text, the “*Glasgow Climate Pact*”, that is setting the tone for international climate cooperation and that is recognising the other agreements made. Some of the highlights are:

- The developed countries **are urged to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion by year goal** urgently and through to 2025, but they are not asked to compensate for the missing, promised climate funding in 2020 and 2021, where the climate funding is expected to be similar to the 2019 level of 80 billion US\$ or less, depending how it is calculated<sup>1</sup>
- The developed countries **are urged to double their climate finance for adaptation by 2025**. As the level was 20-30 billion US\$ in 2019<sup>2</sup> this would give around 50 billion US\$, a balanced share of the promised a balanced share of the 100 billion US\$ of climate finance, but the adaptation finance will come late, as the promise was to be provided from 2020. Also for the adaptation funding, only a small part of the funding is new and additional; some is loans only.
- All countries **are asked to accelerate the dissemination of technologies**, and the adoption of policies, to rapidly scaling up clean power generation and energy efficiency. This shall include accelerating efforts to the “*phase down*” unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. This is the first time that reduction of fossil fuels is mentioned, which is an improvement for international agreements. But in the draft wording had been “phase out”, which was not accepted by India and other countries.
- The countries **recognise that meeting the 1.5°C target will require 45% reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2030** from 2010 and reach net zero by mid century, while current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) lead to 13.7% increase of greenhouse gases in 2030 from 2010.
- The countries **agreed to every year consider improvements in their climate strategies and report every year** on their progress, which will be included in an annual synthesis report on NDCs. This will be used at a new annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition.
- On loss and damage, the developed countries, international institutions, and others **are urged to provide financing for loss and damage**. **No new fund or funding mechanism** was established for loss and damage, but the countries agreed to strengthen the Santiago network that provides information exchange on how to manage climate disasters, thus, how to deal with loss and damage.

## Finalising the Paris Rulebook

While other parts of the rules to implement the Paris Agreement were agreed in 2018, COP26 covered the remaining issues, or at least delegated the work to others.

One problematic part of the rules for **international exchange of emission reduction certificates**, both with bilateral cooperation and with a certificate market. The certificates can also be used to claim *off-set for emissions from international aviation and shipping*. A basic problem is that a rich country can pay other countries to reduce and still claim that it is leading in emission reductions. Specific problems include that old, unused Climate Development Mechanism (CDM) credits from the Kyoto Protocol can be used, even if their claimed reductions are as far back as 2013, and that many of the questionable CDM rules will be used in the new certificate market. For the multilateral certificate market, it is agreed that 5% of the selling price of the certificates shall be given to the Adaptation Fund. A positive outcome is that some bad proposals of double counting of emissions were excluded, but with the use of CDM credits, the certificate market is still a way of reducing actions and increasing emissions.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Nature 20/10 2021, the OECD estimate of 80 billion US\$ in 2019 includes some 17 billion US\$ as private finance and export credits while a large part of the rest was loans. Oxfam estimates the grant value to be around 25-30% of the climate finance estimated by the OECD. Another issue is that much of the climate funding is diverted from other development assistance, so it is not really “new and additional”, as originally promised in 2019, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02846-3>

<sup>2</sup> According to Nature,20/10 2021, with the high amount including projects that contribute to both adaptation and mitigation, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02846-3>

The countries also agreed on an **enhanced transparency framework**, to improve and increase the documentation of emission reductions, as well as of adaptation action and climate finance. This includes a series of tables for emissions, climate finance etc. Not all countries need to fill all parts of the tables. Developed countries and countries that generate emission reduction certificates have the highest requirements for documentation; but there is one set of tables for all.

## Agreements on Future UNFCCC Activities

A number of the decisions are guiding the future of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement process. The main decisions were:

- As mentioned above, there will every year be an annual synthesis of climate actions in NDCs and a ministerial roundtable on how to increase ambitions.
- The Global Stocktake, GST, will now start and the high-level champions are asked to support the effective participation of NGOs.
- The discussion of the target for climate finance post 2025 has now kicked-off; but the text does not include financing for loss & damage post 2025.
- The discussion on the long-term finance agenda was extended until 2027, with the Standing Committee on Finance commissioned to prepare a report ahead of COP27 on progress towards achieving the \$100bn.
- For loss and damage, the Santiago Network for information exchange on how to minimise loss and damage of climate catastrophes will be strengthened.
- A Glasgow 10-year work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) was agreed, to be coordinated by the UNFCCC Secretariat with focus on Education; Training; Public Awareness; Public access to information; Public participation; International Cooperation.
- A work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this decade, with details to be developed by the UNFCCC subsidiary body SBSTA.

Since the two work programs are not funded, it remains to be seen how important they will be.

## Actions Outside the Official Process

During COP26 a lot of national and international commitments were made. Some of them were:

- *Many countries and companies declared to reach net zero emission in 2050 and India in 2070. If all these targets are met and there is a gradual reduction of emissions to reach them, this will limit global warming to 1.8°C; but most of them are not part of national NDCs or long-term strategies (LTS) submitted to UNFCCC, and there is a wide gap from the submitted plans that will lead to 2.7°C warming to the declarations at COP26.*
- Many countries promised new climate funding and *Scotland promised 2 million £ for loss and damage.*
- *A multilateral alliance was formed to reduce methane emissions 30% until 2030, led by the USA.*
- *A multilateral alliance was formed to phase out exploration and extraction of oil and gas, with 11 partners (countries and subnational states) led by Denmark and Costa Rica.*
- *A bilateral agreement between USA and China was made to strengthen climate action.*

## Lack of Inclusiveness of COP26

**The compromised result also reflects that our presence and voices as observers (Civil Society Organisations), were severely restricted due to several barriers.** These included changing travel instructions due to demands by the mandatory COVID PCR tests, vaccination requirements, quarantine periods for those from 'red list' countries, strict visa procedure, and uncertainties, which all led to delays and skyrocketing prices of travel and accommodation, which caused failure by many potential participants to come to COP26. . Moreover, the UNFCCC Secretariat closed the Civil-Society exhibition area, and made it virtual, in practice totally **invisible**, together with a number of side events, and used a very limiting ticket system for participants to access this. In the UN system, civil society organisations are organised in Constituencies, such as environmental, youth,

women, indigenous, researchers, farmers etc. Not even the other Observer constituencies were allowed to exhibit in the Blue Zone, where the negotiations took place. This was all argued as a necessity because of COVID-19, and stood in sharp contrast to allowing the exhibitions of the Country Pavilion Area. Finally, the missing visibility could be the reason that not many negotiators listened to warning signals in those two-minute interventions, when we were allowed to give our opinion through the Constituencies, side events, and through the Peoples Plenary and the march afterwards.

The space was dominated by the powerful big and rich countries and their “business as usual” greenwashing lobby industry, including the dangerous nuclear industry, which were allowed to make exhibitions, as they paid for it. The media did not even notice the **missing exhibition hall with several hundreds of civil society organisations, and renewable energy associations**. The UNFCCC Secretariat wants to be seen as an inclusive COP, showing impressive statistics of the list of delegates permitted entrance, but this also needs to be fact checked, as many who registered were not able to come, especially from the “Global South”. Another surprising barrier of the inclusiveness was that the conference was designed a way that there were **NO electric plugs** in the major meeting hall of Action Zone, corridors, food halls and major side event rooms. The only plugs available were in the two computer rooms, whose size were underestimated, even for the press. As the negotiations were from early morning to the evenings, the missing electric plugs meant a challenge to many of us.

## Looking Ahead to COP27

***For COP27 on the African Continent in Egypt, we demand UNFCCC secretariat to facilitate and not restrict the presence of the civil society, and the renewable energy associations, as well as NOT permitting the promotion of the greenwashing by fossil fuel and nuclear industry, and other false solutions like geoengineering, and unsustainable biomass. Inclusiveness of the civil society and the real solutions, can make an influence on the negotiators, so that they understand more of the sustainable solutions and what is at stake: the people, the planet, and finally the human life on the Earth.***

*We are especially worried about the nuclear power industries plans in Africa. Nuclear power is not an alternative anywhere, and especially not in Africa. Nuclear plants are enormously expensive, and the costs are exponentially increasing with the needed new security measures. They are slow, and want to take away funding from renewables. They can cause radioactive catastrophe earlier than the climate catastrophe comes. In African countries, there is also a high risk of accidents and radioactive leakages of waste; caused by failure in building and in maintenance, because of lacking capacity, technical knowledge, and of high corruption. Moreover, they can be targeted by terrorist actions, used by the military. They indebt a country for 30 years, and the costs emerging in case of an accident is enormous and not included in any budget. We would like UNFCCC to prioritize the presence of the UN agencies of IRENA promoting renewables, rather than IAEA, which is lobbied by countries, where the nuclear industry is based, misunderstanding its role and promoting unsafe nuclear technology instead of safeguarding the existing ones.*

Renewable technologies are flexible as decentralised, available at competitive decreasing prices, much cheaper than nuclear, and the climate funds must be used on the real solutions and not on unsafe, false solutions such as nuclear, geoengineering etc. In Africa, there is also abundant renewable resources and potential for local solutions with mini grids with solar and wind, improved efficient cookstoves using less firewood, household biogas for cooking, solar collectors, dryers, solar cookers etc. In Africa, there is much more sunshine to produce solar power, which might be difficult to imagine in the cloudy Britain in November.

### References

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CAN letter to EU by 129 NGOs, 15.11.2021: <https://caneurope.org/letter-prevent-nuclear-energy-fossil-gas-from-being-labelled-as-green/>  
Women and Gender Constituency: 10.2021, Key Demands, p.10, Geoengineering, BECCs, Nuclear are “No-Go” Solutions, [https://womensgenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/WGC\\_KeyDemandsCOP26\\_EN.pdf](https://womensgenderclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/WGC_KeyDemandsCOP26_EN.pdf)

## ANNEX to INFORSE on COP26 Outcome

Major COP26 decision texts (selected quotes) from <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/glasgow-climate-change-conference-october-november-2021/outcomes-of-the-glasgow-climate-change-conference>

### Glasgow Climate Pact

18. Urges developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation.
22. Recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid century, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases;
25. Notes with serious concern the findings of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, according to which the aggregate greenhouse gas emission level, taking into account implementation of all submitted nationally determined contributions, is estimated to be 13.7 per cent above the 2010 level in 2030;
27. Decides to establish a work programme to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade, and requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session, in a manner that complements the global stocktake;
29. requests Parties to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their nationally determined contributions as necessary to align with the Paris Agreement temperature goal by the end of 2022, taking into account different national circumstances;
30. Also requests the secretariat to annually update the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, referred to in decision 1/CMA.2, paragraph 10....
31. Decides to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on pre-2030 ambition, .....
36. Calls upon Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition;
43. Emphasizes the need to mobilize climate finance from all sources to reach the level needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, including significantly increasing support for developing country Parties, beyond USD 100 billion per year;
44. Notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not yet been met, and welcomes the increased pledges made by many developed country Parties and the Climate Finance Delivery Plan: Meeting the US\$100 Billion Goal<sup>6</sup> and the collective actions contained therein;
46. Urges developed country Parties to fully deliver on the USD 100 billion goal urgently and through to 2025 .....

49. Welcomes with appreciation the initiation of deliberations on a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, and looks forward to the ad hoc work programme established under decision -/CMA.37 and to engaging constructively in the actions contained therein;

58. Welcomes the outcomes of the “COP26 Catalyst for Climate Action” and the strong commitments made by many Parties to take forward action on capacity-building;

#### VI. Loss and damage

63. Reiterates the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects;

64. Urges developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations entities and intergovernmental organizations and other bilateral and multilateral institutions, including non-governmental organizations and private sources, to provide enhanced and additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

67. Decides that the Santiago network will be provided with funds to support technical assistance for the implementation of relevant approaches to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing countries in support of the functions set out in paragraph 9 of decision -/CMA.3;

70. Urges developed country Parties to provide funds for the operation of the Santiago network and for the provision of technical assistance as set out in paragraph 67 above;

73. Decides to establish the Glasgow Dialogue between Parties, relevant organizations and stakeholders to discuss the arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change, to take place in the first sessional period of each year of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, concluding at its sixtieth session (June 2024);

...

76. Welcomes the start of the global stocktake, and expresses its determination for the process to be comprehensive, inclusive and consistent with Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and decision 19/CMA.1, in the light of paragraph 5 above;

77. Encourages the high-level champions to support the effective participation of non-Party stakeholders in the global stocktake;

78. Recalls the Katowice climate package, and welcomes with appreciation the completion of the Paris Agreement work programme, including the adoption of decisions on the following:

(a) Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);<sup>13</sup>

(b) Methodological issues relating to the enhanced transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);<sup>14</sup>

(c) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);

(d) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);<sup>16</sup> (

e) Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);<sup>17</sup>

(f) Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);18

(g) Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement (decision -/CMA.3);1

86. Notes the urgent need to close the gaps in implementation towards the goals of the Paris Agreement and invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene world leaders in 2023 to consider ambition to 2030;

89. Welcomes the improvement of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action<sup>23</sup> for enhancing ambition, the leadership and actions of the high-level champions, and the work of the secretariat on the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform to support accountability and track progress of voluntary initiatives;

91. Urges Parties to swiftly begin implementing the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment, respecting, promoting and considering their respective obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women;

### **Next COP's**

COP27, 7-18/11 2022 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt

COP28, 6-17/11 2023 in UAE

COP29, Eastern Europe

### **Common time-frames**

Encourages Parties to communicate in 2025 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2035, in 2030 a nationally determined contribution with an end date of 2040, and so forth every five years thereafter.

### **Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)**

4. Adopts the 10-year Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment, contained in the annex, taking into account the elements identified as effective in supporting implementation as well as gaps, needs and opportunities for improvement;

5. Invites Parties and relevant non-Party stakeholders to engage in and support implementation of the Glasgow work programme while maintaining a country-driven approach;

6. Also invites multilateral and bilateral institutions and organizations, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as appropriate, to provide financial support for activities related to implementing Action for Climate Empowerment;

8. Also encourages Parties to continue designating, assigning responsibilities to, and providing support, including technical and financial support, and access to information and materials to national Action for Climate Empowerment focal points;

11. Also requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to:

(a) Facilitate implementation of the Glasgow work programme under the guidance of its Chair, subject to the availability of financial resources;

(b) Hold an annual in-session Action for Climate Empowerment dialogue.....

(c) Focus the first in-session dialogue, to be held at its fifty-sixth session (June 2022), on the engagement of children and youth

(e) Undertake the development of an action plan at its fifty-sixth session focusing on immediate action through short-term, clear and time-bound activities, guided by the priority areas set out in the Glasgow work programme, with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for adoption by Conference of the Parties at its twenty-seventh session (November 2022) a

13. Invites Parties and observers to submit their views on matters to be addressed at the in-session workshop referred to in paragraph 11(f) above via the submission portal<sup>3</sup> by 28 February 2022;

ANNEX: Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE)

5. Four thematic priority areas have been identified as relevant to addressing gaps and challenges in implementing the six ACE elements and for creating opportunities to accelerate that implementation

#### A Policy Coherence

##### B. Coordinated action

9. This priority area has the aim of continuing to build long-term, strategic, operational, multilevel, multi-stakeholder, intergenerational partnerships that bring together different expertise, resources and knowledge to accelerate ACE implementation. Such partnerships can be fostered by undertaking the following activities at the international level:

(a) Holding an annual in-session ACE dialogue at the first regular session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation each year

(b) Organizing an annual youth forum in

(c) Inviting Parties and stakeholders to develop international, regional and national programmes and activities, including the preparation of training and education materials and tools, using local languages where applicable and practical

##### C. Tools and support

#### Implementing the six elements of Action for Climate Empowerment

- 1- Education
- 2- Training
- 3- Public Awareness
- 4- Public access to information
- 5- Public participation
- 6- International Cooperation

The countries are encouraged to engage within these 6 elements

### **Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement**

ANNEX to document:

6. For all ITMOs (ITMOs in a non-GHG metric determined by the participating Parties and ITMOs measured in t CO<sub>2</sub> eq), each participating Party shall apply corresponding adjustments, consistently with this guidance and relevant future decisions of the CMA.

#### B. Application of corresponding adjustments

7. Each participating Party shall apply corresponding adjustments in a manner that ensures transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency; that participation in cooperative approaches does not



lead to a net increase in emissions across participating Parties within and between NDC implementation periods;....

16. Where a participating Party authorizes the use of mitigation outcomes for other international mitigation purposes(read: aviation), it shall apply a corresponding adjustment, for the first transfer of such mitigation outcomes consistently with this guidance.

17 Each participating Party shall ensure that the use of cooperative approaches does not lead to a net increase in emissions of participating Parties

### **Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement**

5. Requests the Supervisory Body to:

(a) Develop provisions for the development and approval of methodologies, validation, registration, monitoring, verification and certification, issuance, renewal, first transfer from the mechanism registry, voluntary cancellation and other processes

....

..

..

(b) Appropriate levels for the share of proceeds for administrative expenses and its operation, including in order to enable a periodic contribution to the share of proceeds for adaptation for the Adaptation Fund;

7- Further requests the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to develop:

(b) Processes for implementation of the transition of activities from the clean development mechanism to Article 6, paragraph 4, in accordance with chapter XI.A of the annex (Transition of clean development mechanism activities);

(c) Processes for implementation of chapter XI.B of the annex (Use of certified emission reductions towards first or first updated nationally determined contributions);

### **Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement**

The CMA Requests the Supervisory Body to:

(a) Develop provisions for the development and approval of methodologies, validation, registration, monitoring, verification and certification, issuance, renewal, first transfer from the mechanism registry, voluntary cancellation and other processes, pursuant to chapter V.B–L and chapter VIII of the annex (Delivering overall mitigation in global emissions);

(b) In the context of developing and approving new methodologies for the mechanism:

(i) Review the baseline and monitoring methodologies in use for the clean development mechanism under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol with a view to applying them with revisions as appropriate pursuant to chapter V.B of the annex (Methodologies), for the activities under the mechanism (hereinafter referred to as Article 6, paragraph 4, activities);

(c) Review the sustainable development tool in use for the clean development mechanism and other tools and safeguard systems in use in existing market-based mechanisms to promote sustainable development with a view to developing similar tools for the mechanism by the end of 2023;

(d) Review the accreditation standards and procedures of the clean development mechanism with a view to applying them with revisions as appropriate, for the mechanism by the end of 2023;

6. Also requests the Supervisory Body to elaborate and further develop,.....

(b) Appropriate levels for the share of proceeds for administrative expenses and its operation, including in order to enable a periodic contribution to the share of proceeds for adaptation for the Adaptation Fund;

7. Further requests the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to.....

(b) Processes for implementation of the transition of activities from the clean development mechanism to Article 6, paragraph 4, in accordance with chapter XI.A of the annex (Transition of clean development mechanism activities);

(h) The consideration of whether activities could include emissions avoidance and conservation enhancement activities;

## **ANNEX**

The host country shall

(f) Shall apply a crediting period for the issuance of A6.4ERs, that is a maximum of 5 years, renewable a maximum of twice, or a maximum of 10 years with no option of renewal, that is appropriate to the activity, or, in respect of activities involving removals, a crediting period of a maximum of 15 years renewable a maximum of twice, that is appropriate to the activity,

35. Mechanism methodologies may be developed by activity participants, host Parties, stakeholders or the Supervisory Body. Mechanism methodologies shall be approved by the Supervisory Body

36. Each mechanism methodology shall require the application of one of the approach(es) below to setting the baseline,

(a) A performance-based approach, taking into account:

(i) Best available technologies that represent an economically feasible and environmentally sound course of action, where appropriate;

(ii) An ambitious benchmark approach where the baseline is set at least at the average emission level of the best performing comparable activities providing similar outputs and services in a defined scope in similar social, economic, environmental and technological circumstances;

(iii) An approach based on existing actual or historical emissions, adjusted downwards to ensure alignment with paragraph 33 above

38. Each mechanism methodology shall specify the approach to demonstrating the additionality of the activity.....

39. The Supervisory Body may apply simplified approaches for demonstration of additionality for any least developed country or small island developing State

42. The host Party shall provide a statement to the Supervisory Body specifying whether it authorizes A6.4ERs issued for the activity for use towards achievement of NDCs and/or for other international mitigation purposes as defined in.....

44. The host Party shall apply a corresponding adjustment for A6.4ERs that are authorized for other purposes, in accordance with chapter X below (Use of emission reductions for other international mitigation purposes),.....

66. The share of proceeds that is levied to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation shall be delivered to the Adaptation Fund .... The share of proceeds to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation shall be comprised of:

(a) A levy of 5% of of A6.4ER's

(b) A monetary contribution related to the scale of the Article 6, paragraph 4, activity or to the number of A6.4ERs issued, to be set by the Supervisory Body;

(c) After the mechanism becomes self-financing, a periodic contribution from the remaining funds received from administrative expenses a per cent of A6.4ERs at issuance;

69. Delivery of overall mitigation in global emissions shall be enhanced through mandatory cancellation of A6.4ERs that are also accounted for in accordance with the following:

(a) The mechanism registry administrator shall effect a first transfer of a minimum of 2 per cent of the issued A6.4ERs to the cancellation account ..... where those A6.4ERs shall be cancelled;

72. Where a host Party has authorized A6.4ERs for use for other international mitigation purposes pursuant to chapter V.C above (Approval and authorization) above, it shall apply a corresponding adjustment for the first transfer of all authorized A6.4ERs, consistently with decision -/CMA.3.12

73. Project activities and programmes of activities registered under the clean development mechanism under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM) or listed as provisional as per the temporary measures adopted by the Executive Board of the CDM may transition to the mechanism and be registered as Article 6, paragraph 4, activities subject to all of the following conditions:

(a) The request to transition the CDM project activity or programme of activity being made to the secretariat and the CDM host Party as defined by decision 3/CMP.1, by or on behalf of the project participants that were approved by that CDM host Party by no later than 31 December 2023;

(d) The activity may continue to apply its current approved CDM methodology until the earlier of the end of its current crediting period or 31 December 2025, following which, it shall apply an approved methodology pursuant to chapter V.B above (Methodologies);

75.. Certified emission reductions (CERs) issued under the CDM may be used towards achievement of an NDC provided the following conditions are met:

(a) The CDM project activity or CDM programme of activities was registered on or after 1 January 2013;

(b) The CERs shall be transferred to and held in the mechanism registry and identified as pre-2021 emission reductions;

(c) The CERs may be used towards achievement of the first NDC only; (d) The CDM host Party shall not be required to apply a corresponding adjustment consistently with decision -/CMA.314 in respect of the CERs and not be subject to the share of proceeds pursuant to chapter VII above (Levy of share of proceeds for adaptation and administrative expenses) above;